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3Preface
This working paper has been published as part of preparations 
for the SDC Mekong Strategy 2013-2017. In this framework, and 
in order to help define its Lao programme, SDC has carried out 
an independent Agriculture and Natural Resources analytical study.
This study has three main objectives of roughly equal importance:
1) To document developments in the agriculture and 
natural resources sector since 2007, taking stock of 
reforms, achievements, and blockages; to track trends 
in policies – the scope and pace of reform - and their 
impact on agricultural development and rural poverty, 
particularly on upland small-scale farmer communities.
2) To understand why and how things are happening in 
the agriculture and natural resources sector: who are 
the major actors and stakeholders in agricultural reforms 
(e.g. in the foreseen shift from subsistence to commercial 
agriculture); what are their stated and unstated objectives, 
their interests and power? Among these, who are the 
drivers and restrainers of change? How are they exercising 
their power and influence? What are the central-level 
decisions regarding the provincial agenda? What are the 
potential impacts of the resource-based economy 
model chosen by the government on rural society?
3) To assess the feasibility of current government strategies and 
plans and the significance of possible Swiss contribution 
to the implementation of these, taking into account 
SDC’s mandate and values regarding fair and equitable 
rural development.
4Executive Summary
This report provides a number of perspectives on how and why 
agriculture and the natural resource sectors are changing in Laos. 
These ideas should help donors like Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation (SDC) in planning and managing their country 
strategies. 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry has explained the rapid 
transition of rural livelihoods and farming systems by referring to 
two main drivers: the push of government policy and the pull of 
the market. This reports outlines five other drivers that may 
contribute to a deeper understanding of what is happening:
•	 The	unfinished	revolution:	the	Lao	People’s	Revolutionary	
Party (LPRP) still aims to achieve a ‘transformation’ of 
society that would replace traditional farming systems 
with modern and industrialised forms of production. 
•	 Laos	 as	 a	 periphery	 country:	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	
world systems analysis, Laos is typical of a periphery 
country, having weak governance and being open to 
exploitation by more developed neighbours.
•	 Paternalism	and	patronage:	patron-client	relationships	
are central to Lao political culture. 
•	 The	resource	curse:	the	World	Bank	has	pointed	to	the	
dangers of a growing ‘institutional gap’ when too many 
projects start at the same time in a country with limited 
management and monitoring capacity.
•	 The	networked	society:	Laos	is	becoming	‘info-linked’.	
State control of communications is rapidly disappearing, 
the consequences of which are unpredictable.
Three specific policies are briefly examined: turning land into 
capital, the eradication of shifting cultivation and the promotion 
of large-scale agribusiness. Despite the differences in the way 
5these policies have emerged, they form an intelligible strategy of 
socio-economic restructuring that is largely explained by the drivers 
described above: these ‘choices’ are a central part of the 
on-going revolution taking place in a periphery country under the 
management of a paternalistic regime.
At face value, these policies appear to be symptomatic of a 
technocratic approach to national development (an approach 
favoured by Marxist governments and international financial 
institutions alike) that aims to improve productivity and economic 
growth regardless of social and environmental costs. If this were 
true, however, we might expect government planning to be more 
systematic, consistent or coherent than it actually is. 
Behind the technocratic veneer in Laos is a cultural institution that 
could be called ‘neopatrimonialism’. This involves the use of state 
authority and apparatus to sustain a system of patronage. The 
concept of neopatrimonialism helps to explain why organisational 
structures and strategies tend to change with senior appointments, 
and why so many development projects appear to be designed 
to benefit government officials as much as they benefit ordinary 
people.
This analysis throws light on what is happening in the agriculture 
sector of Laos, but does not provide many pointers for donor 
support. Consequently, the report goes on to identify a number 
of ‘megatrends’ taking place in Laos, which cut across society as 
a whole, with consequences for development programmes in all 
sectors. These megatrends are increasing dynamism, increasing 
inequality, increasing complexity, increasing connectedness, and 
increasing uncertainty. 
A number of suggestions are made about how a development 
agency like SDC can adapt its strategy and portfolio in light of 
these megatrends. 
6•	 Intelligence:	the	challenge	is	not	only	to	collect	and	store	
data, but to carry out analysis, develop scenarios and 
make projections.
•	 Goal-setting:	 some	 of	 the	 goals	 of	 the	 past	 are	 no	
longer relevant. Resilience and equity are becoming more 
important.
•	 Targeting:	there	needs	to	be	a	greater	specificity	with	
regard to location and clients. Some groups no longer 
need support.
•	 Responsiveness:	donors	may	need	to	devote	a	greater	
portion of resources to emergency response and 
contingencies.
•	 Flexibility:	implementation	needs	to	be	managed	in	an	
organic rather than mechanical manner.
•	 Pluralism:	by	supporting	multiple	groups	and	associations,	
programmes and projects can spread risk and promote 
innovation.
•	 Networks:	help	vulnerable	groups	to	make	connections	
and build alliances that enable them solve their own 
problems.
The report concludes by looking at the need for mitigation 
measures in the agriculture and natural resource sectors. Although 
aid projects are no longer a primary instigator of change in these 
sectors, donors can play an important role in helping rural people 
cope with the changes that are taking place. Although efforts to 
promote ‘green’ agriculture may still be worth supporting, more 
and more rural people have to deal with the inevitable 
consequences of ‘brown’ agriculture. Ten specific issues are 
identified that require attention from the donor community:
71. Occupational health, in particular exposure to toxic 
chemicals.
2. Environmental pollution, including plastic film and animal 
waste.
3. Epidemic diseases, for which Laos already has a poor 
reputation.
4. Soil erosion, as a consequence of land clearance and 
monocultures.
5. Food security - already a concern but is cash cropping 
making it worse? 
6. Indebtedness is emerging as another area of concern
7. Rural unemployment, leading to out-migration from 
rural areas.
8. Land conflicts have become violent in neighbouring 
countries: will this happen in Laos?
9. Loss of biodiversity, in a country with globally important 
collections.
10. The carbon footprint will also increase due to the expansion 
of industrial agriculture.
81. Introduction 
This report was prepared to support an internal review by the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation in the Lao PDR. 
The review is part of preparation for the SDC Mekong Regional 
Strategy 2013-2017. The consultant was specifically tasked with 
examining trends in the agriculture and natural resource 
management (NRM) sectors. 
The study, carried out in January and February 2012, included an 
examination of recent reports and discussions with key people in 
Vientiane. The report draws upon 30 years of experience working 
in Southeast Asia, and the author’s role as moderator of the 
LaoFAB discussion forum. 
The trends in the agricultural and NRM sectors in Laos have been 
the subject of a number of studies and reports. Consequently, it 
is not the intention of this report to give a detailed account of all 
the changes in policies, technologies, investments and production 
figures. Instead, this report attempts to explain how and why 
things are happening in the agriculture and NRM sectors, and to 
examine the implications for the SDC portfolio.
9No single explanation for the on-going trends will suffice. Therefore 
a number of inter-related perspectives have been assembled, in 
the hope that these will provide food for thought. These are not 
conclusions, but pieces of an emerging picture. 
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2. An Overview of Change in Rural Laos
The changes that have been taking place in rural Laos over the 
past five to ten years are well documented. Among the most 
important developments are:
•	 Demographics:	Although	 the	 growth	 rate	may	 have	
fallen below 2% in the past year or so, the total population 
has already reached 6.5 million, with half under the age 
of 20. This puts pressure on natural resources, but there 
is also a high level of out-migration from rural areas, 
with at least 300,000 Lao people working in Thailand. 
•	 Opening	up	of	 rural	 areas:	 This	 has	 led	 to	 improved	
access to markets and services, but also put pressure on 
resources. By the time of the 2005 census, the country 
had 33,000 km of roads. The number of mobile phones 
in Laos went from zero to over half a million in the ten 
years between 1995 and 2005. Clearly the numbers of 
roads and phones have increased greatly since 2005, 
but accurate statistics are hard to come by. 
•	 Increase	in	paddy	rice	production:	Due	to	expansion	of	
irrigation and the adoption of new techniques, national 
rice production has risen from approximately one million 
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tonnes per annum at the beginning of the 1990s to over 
3 million tonnes in 2010. Average rice yields in Laos – at 
just over 3 tonnes per hectare – are now higher than 
those in Thailand.  
•	 Expansion	of	cash	crops:	By	the	end	of	2010,	more	than	
half a million hectares were planted with maize, rubber, 
coffee, cassava and sugar. In upland areas these cash 
crops have often replaced the rice previously grown 
under shifting cultivation.   
•	 Granting	of	land	concessions:	More	than	2,000	agreements	
have been signed by the Government, covering at least 
1.6 million ha. Although more than half of these agreements 
are non-agricultural, the local impact of large concessions 
for rubber or eucalyptus has been a cause of great 
concern. 
•	 Climate	change:	In	the	north	of	Laos,	rainfall	has	declined	
by 16 cm in the past 50 years and average temperature 
has increased by almost 1º C. There has been a noticeable 
increase in extreme weather events during the past 
decade, while farmers also report changes in rainfall 
patterns including - importantly - the start date for the 
rainy season.
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These changes are bringing many benefits in addition to a wide 
range of problems. GDP growth has reached almost  8% and is 
expected to remain high over the next few years.  
Growth in the agriculture sector has been lower, at around 4%, 
and has clearly led to improvements in the income of a large 
number of rural households. Across the country, the poverty rate 
has fallen from 46% in 1993 to 20.4% by 2010.  The benefits of 
this growth are not spread equally. Qualitative poverty assess-
ments show that in some regions poverty has not changed and 
may even have increased. Across the country the Gini coefficient 
has increased dramatically, and there is clear evidence that some 
ethnic groups are finding it more difficult to make the transition 
to sedentary commercial agriculture. Levels of malnutrition remain 
high. In short, while the Government is succeeding in reducing 
some forms of poverty, there is a danger that groups of ‘new 
poor’ may be emerging.
The report on Farmer’s Voices (Arnst, 2010) gives a stark impression 
of how these changes are affecting rural livelihoods, creating both 
winners and losers: 
“Earlier we had a lot of hardships but now we can sell corn for 
income”. 
“Today we have the market near our village so we can see more 
foods and we can eat many kinds of foods”. 
“Now we eat well, but we are in debt. Before we did not eat 
well, but we had no debt”.
“The future will be worse because nature is gone. We will just 
be labour for the foreign businesses”.
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3. Looking for Explanations 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) has explained the 
rapid transition of rural livelihoods and farming systems by 
referring to two main drivers: the push of government policy and 
the pull of the market. This distinction is a useful starting point. It 
is certainly the case that public investment in infrastructure, in 
addition to the policy of ‘turning land into capital’, has brought 
about massive changes in the ownership and utilization of land. It 
is also true that the shift from subsistence to commercial 
production has been made possible by the demands of the 
regional and global economy. But the push and pull analysis does 
not provide a deeper understanding of why and how the transition 
is taking place, nor does it throw any light on the issue of winners 
and losers. 
A comprehensive study of the drivers of change (DoC) in Laos would 
be worthwhile. The DoC methods used by the UK Department for 
International Development and the Swedish International 
Development Agency in other countries give more attention to 
institutions and power than has been the case with many studies 
of change in Laos. A detailed analysis of this kind is not possible 
under this assignment. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw 
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attention to a number of perspectives that may contribute to a 
deeper understanding of what is happening in Laos.   
 3.1 The Unfinished Revolution  
Laos is governed by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP). 
The name of the Party is significant, indicating an ambition that 
goes far beyond the development agenda that underpins the 
work of donor agencies. While western donors wish to support 
incremental change and capacity-building, the LPRP wants to bring 
about nothing less than a restructuring of society and the economy, 
and the sooner the better! The donor concern for equity and human 
rights may be seen as a luxury by a revolutionary regime like the LPRP, 
which believes the ends justify the means. While continuity and 
consistency may be important to planners and managers of 
development programmes and projects, they can be a constraint to 
revolutionary leaders. Consequently, government departments and 
strategies come and go at a bewildering speed, but what is constant is 
the Party rhetoric of ’transformation’ and ‘renovation’, with 8% growth 
and LDC graduation as the latest indicators of success. 
The LPRP is overseeing accelerating transformation.          
Massive changes in land ownership and utilization have 
come with foreign investment as the Party pursues         
modernisation.
Some may doubt the relevance of this explanation with regards to recent 
change in the agriculture and natural resource sectors. After all, the 
revolution in Laos has been going on for more than 50 years, and has 
long been a justification for socially disruptive policies such as 
collectivization, resettlement and the eradication of shifting cultivation. 
What is different about recent years is that the Party has established 
new partnerships with foreign investors that allows them to greatly 
accelerate the process of transformation. Fullbrook has described the 
ongoing transformation as the ‘Big Push’. 
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“The Big Push for resource-intensive development extracted from the 
environment should generate substantial annual revenues for the 
government, something like $1 billion per year, perhaps more, by 2010 
if not earlier. This is the seductive promise of the Big Push that 
generates a logic and rationality accepting negative consequences, 
such as threats to food security, as necessary costs that will be 
exceeded by the promise of greater revenues. The Big Push has 
developed a momentum that only grows as more projects take shape, 
fattening the promise”.    
There is no doubt that the Big Push provides enormous opportunities 
for personal gain among government officials, but the official 
justification for large investment projects, and the rationale for 
accepting (or denying) various negative impacts, is rooted in the 
obsessive drive for modernisation and industrialisation. With the 
LPRP firmly in control of the country for the foreseeable future, 
the push of government policy will continue to be guided by the 
idea of revolution as much as - or more than - it is by the idea of 
development. 
 3.2 Laos as a Periphery Country 
Turning to the pull of the markets, it is important to recognise 
that market forces are not a neutral set of demands or opportunities 
that are applied equally to all countries in the region. Laos is a 
late-comer to globalization, and what it brings to the game is a 
large quantity of raw materials: timber, minerals, water that can 
be used to drive turbines, and soil that can be used to produce 
commodities such as rubber, maize, sugar and cassava. The country 
lacks a skilled work force, a domestic market, and any significant 
capacity for processing and manufacturing. This makes Laos very 
different from China, Vietnam and Thailand, but puts it in the 
same category as Cambodia.  
From the perspective of world systems analysis, Laos is typical of 
a periphery country. It has weak governance and is open to 
16
exploitation by more developed 
neighbours. As countries like 
China move up the international 
pecking order, their demands 
on countries like Laos and 
Cambodia become more acute. 
Foreign experts working in Laos 
have often commented on the 
low concession rates and tax 
exemptions granted to overseas 
investors .  I t  seems that 
resources are being given away 
when they could earn far more 
for the country; if individual 
dams, mines and plantations 
were earning a lot more, the 
country would not need so 
many of them. Some of these giveaway deals may be explained 
by ignorance or corruption, but they are also consistent with the 
low bargaining power of Lao officials. Given that Chinese 
companies are willing to invest in mines and plantations in Africa 
and Latin America, they are clearly price-setters not price-takers 
when they negotiates deals in Laos. There is nothing unique about 
Lao copper or Lao rubber - these same commodities are being 
produced in dozens of other locations around the world. In some 
cases those other locations have ports, railways or processing 
capacity that give them a comparative advantage over Laos.  
Laos is a late-comer to globalization, and what it brings 
to the game is a large quantity of raw materials.        
With weak governance, it is open to exploitation by 
more developed neighbours: resources could earn far 
more for the country but Lao officials have low         
bargaining power. 
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Barney has taken the idea that Laos is a periphery country and 
gone a step further, to examine what happens at the ‘resource 
frontier’, which he describes as those areas of the country “where 
new forms of social property relations and systems of legality are 
rapidly established in response to market imperatives”. He finds 
that the processes are far more complex, and the outcomes far 
more diverse, than might have been assumed.
“There is no singular political-economic rationality or intentionality 
at work in the Lao uplands: neoliberal, clientist, bureaucratic and 
extractive-accumulation logics interact with provincial and district 
levels of the state and with local livelihood practices, to produce a 
complex and relational networking of the upland frontier in Laos”.
If this analysis is correct, we may conclude that while the world 
systems model suggests it is the inescapable plight of Laos to be 
exploited by more developed countries, we should avoid making 
generalizations about the consequences at the local level.  
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   3.3 Paternalism and Patronage
International observers often portray Laos as an authoritarian state. 
Strictly speaking this is true: the country is run by a self-appointed elite that 
continues to block the development of civil society. But there is an absence 
of overt oppression of the kind that exists in North Korea or - until 
recently - in Myanmar. In a message posted to LaoFAB in 2008, a 
commentator using the name Ralph Fitch suggested that it would be more 
useful to describe the Lao regime as ‘paternalistic’. The message noted 
that…
“In the past week the “Vientiane Times” has reported on a meeting 
of agricultural experts who complained that ‘farmers are not getting 
the message’, while also telling its readers that a number of new land 
concessions have been granted that would force thousands of farmers 
to become labourers for foreign-owed rubber plantations. Clearly, the 
Government doesn’t trust rural people to make sensible decisions for 
themselves.”
“Also on the list of groups who need ‘guidance’ from the Government 
are academics, the business community and young people. Various 
excuses are offered for not allowing citizens to express their 
views – the farmers are uneducated, the women are shy, the students 
are inexperienced - but the outcome is the same: the Party has the 
first and last word on every issue”.
“In his seminal work on Asian Power and Politics (1985), Lucian Pye 
wrote that ‘in Asian political cultures the establishment of the nation 
state as the basic framework for politics and  government has not 
weakened, and indeed in many cases has strengthened, the ideals of 
paternalistic authority.” 
While Laos may be portrayed as an authoritarian state, 
there is an absence of overt oppression and it may be 
more useful to describe the regime as ‘paternalistic’. 
Patron-client relationships are central to the system, 
and the political culture is not conducive to some of 
the changes that donors support.
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Paternalism exists in different forms across Southeast Asia. Every 
country in the region has experienced problems associated with a 
national ‘father figure’, a dominant individual or institution 
claiming to represent the interests of the people. Inevitably he 
becomes old and sick, but rarely will he prepare for his succession. 
The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party is one such father figure. 
The Party may have the best interests of the people at heart, but 
citizens are treated like children who should be ‘seen and not 
heard’.  Like many old men, the Party is opinionated and 
unreasonable. It plays at favourites, is both stubborn and 
inconsistent, and seems to believe that it will live forever. 
Martin Stuart-Fox has been a critical observer of Laos for many 
years. His latest report (2011) describes how - despite the material 
and economic changes of recent years - the political system remains 
unchanged.   
“Patron-client relationships are central to Lao political culture, and they 
function in communist Laos as traditionally they have always done. 
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Clients include, first and foremost, members of the patron’s extended 
family. They also include personal friends and the relations from the 
patron’s region of origin (still very important in regionally divided 
Laos), from school and university, and through party connections and 
business interests. At the higher levels, patron-client networks may 
be cemented by intermarriage between families.”
Stuart-Fox also writes about civil society, the media, corruption and 
the legal system. Not everybody will agree with his bleak assessment 
of the current situation in Laos, but it is clear that the political culture 
is not conducive to some of the changes that donors wish to support. 
 3.4  The Resource Curse
In December 2011, Oxford Policy Management released a report 
called “Blessing or curse?“ According to this report, Laos has now 
joined the club of mineral-dependent countries.  
The danger of the resource curse has been recognised in Laos for 
some years. In October 2007, Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel-Prize winning 
economist who has written widely on the topic, visited Laos and 
made a presentation to the Ministry of Planning and Investment 
(MPI). His visit was reported in the Vientiane Times (31 October 2007): 
“Laos has approved a raft of resource-based investment projects, 
mainly in mining and hydropower, and some concerns have been 
raised over issues of natural resource management and income gen-
eration.”
“The professor suggested that the country focus on better manage-
ment of these resources and seek ways to maximise revenue from 
them.”
“If you want to maximise revenue, you need to be transparent,” he 
said.
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“Prof Stiglitz agreed that the media had an important role to play in 
country development as freedom of information could weaken the 
growth of corruption and force better development.”
There is little evidence to suggest that the visit of Stiglitz had any 
affect on the behaviour of the MPI or the Government in 
general. Transparency in decision-making has not improved. Laos 
has yet to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, and 
there continue to be delays in releasing land concessions data that 
has been collected and analysed with the support of a bilateral donor. 
The most notorious example of opaque decision-making in the 
past few years has been the Xayabury dam. Laos has declined to 
organise any public consultations on this issue  and statements 
made by government representatives at international meetings 
have been ambiguous or contradictory.  
Although the danger of ‘resource curse’ has been 
recognised in Laos for some years, transparency in 
decision-making has not improved. Revenues from 
extractive industries are  highly concentrated, helping 
reinforce the political status quo. The situation is 
similar for the agriculture sector, to which investors 
are now bringing more funds than development 
projects do. Consequently, the influence of donor 
agencies is declining.
This brings us to one of the key mechanisms of the resource curse: 
the revenue stream from extractive industries is highly 
concentrated, which helps reinforce the political status quo. 
If this is correct, the likelihood of improvements in governance in 
Laos suffered a major setback as soon as money started to flow 
from the Sepon gold and copper mine and from the Nam Theun 
2 dam.  
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Perhaps with this in mind, the World Bank made the resource 
curse the main theme for the Lao PDR Development Report in 
2010. Although the words ‘curse’ and ‘corruption’ are not 
mentioned until page 42, the theme is clear from the title of 
chapters 1 and 2: ‘Natural resource wealth does not imply 
automatic gains from its exploitation’ and ‘Strengthening 
governance in the natural resource sector is a key determinant of 
sustainable, inclusive growth’.
The World Bank report focuses on mining and hydropower, but 
similar dynamics are at work in the agriculture sector. The World 
Bank’s observations are equally valid for agricultural concessions 
as they are for mining concessions: 
“Good governance is key to ensuring that a country’s resource 
wealth translates into sustainable economic growth. 
International experience suggests that governance tends to 
deteriorate when a country receives large natural resource rents. 
In particular, the institutional gap can grow when too many 
projects are starting at the same time in a country where 
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capacity to manage and monitor projects is limited. As a result, 
the government may not implement projects with high financial 
and economic returns, or with the appropriate environmental 
and social infrastructure. This could undermine the sustainable 
natural resource development needed to reduce poverty and 
enhance growth over the long run”.
Chinese and Vietnamese investment projects are now bringing more 
funds into the agriculture sector than western development projects. 
This is particularly true at provincial and district levels, where the real 
impacts on livelihoods and the environment will occur. Consequently, 
the influence of the donor agencies in this sector is declining. It is 
quite possible that within a few years donors could be pushed to the 
margins, both at the national level and in the field. Increasingly, the 
real business of agriculture will be managed by the private sector, 
with government officials playing the role of rent collectors and with 
donor partners reduced to frustrated observers. 
 
 3.5 The Networked Society
It has become something of a cliche in recent years to say that Laos 
is now a ‘land-linked country’. In contrast to the land-locked status 
that was mentioned in the opening paragraph of hundreds of 
earlier reports, the country is now being celebrated for being at the 
‘crossroads’ of the region.  
The connections being made between Laos and its neighbours take 
many forms, not just roads and bridges but also the transmission 
lines from a growing number of hydropower dams, and the market 
chains that connect small farmers with consumers who are hundreds 
or thousands of kilometres away.  
Some connections are less likely to be celebrated: migrant 
workers, livestock diseases, pirated goods and amphetamines. All of 
these are crossing borders, coming and going with limited controls. 
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One connection that is given even less attention, yet could bring 
about even greater changes, is information. Roads are carrying 
ideas as well as commodities, and the remittances of migrant 
workers include knowledge as well as money. As more and more 
farmers start to use mobile phones, their understanding of markets 
is racing ahead of the local officials who are trying to advise them. 
As satellite dishes appear in more and more villages, the citizens of 
Laos often have a better idea of what is happening in Thailand or 
Vietnam than the events taking place in their own country.  
The connections being made between Laos and its 
neighbours include the arrival of new avenues of         
information. As a consequence of Laos becoming an 
‘info-linked’ country, people will be making different 
decisions and asking questions that will not be           
welcomed by those in power. To avoid frustration and 
realise rights, there must be more open 
dialogue.  
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The consequences of Laos becoming an ‘info-linked’ country are 
hard to predict, but we can be sure that this knowledge is affecting 
the hopes and fears of people across the country. Farmers will be 
making a different assessment of their opportunities and 
constraints. Business managers will make different decisions. 
Students will have different aspirations. Many people will be 
asking questions that were previously unthinkable. 
Many of those questions will not be welcomed by those in 
power. The hegemony over thinking about ‘development’ in Laos, 
long held by the Government and the donor-partners, is now 
eroding. The paternalism of the past will not satisfy the 
expectations that emerge from this enlightenment. Instead, if 
frustration is to be avoided and rights are to be realised, there 
must be a more open and candid dialogue about what is 
happening in the country. 
Since history began, there has been a close relationship between 
power structures and available forms of communication. In recent 
years, the mobile phone and the internet have made a significant 
contribution to the downfall of authoritarian regimes in various 
parts of the world, as documented in Paul Mason’s latest book 
Why It’s Kicking Off Everywhere. It is not the communication 
technology per se that causes these revolutions, it is the networks 
that become possible when the flow of information is no longer 
controlled by the State.  
Myanmar is one country where social networks backed by new 
forms of communication have contributed to the reform process. 
There are strong reasons, summarised by Michael Vatikiotis in 
Asia Times last year, for doubting that recent developments in 
Myanmar will lead to any kind of Asian Spring. At the same time, 
however, there are few reasons for thinking that Laos will be 
immune from the kind of ‘rightful resistance’ that can be seen in 
every other country in the region. Interesting times lie ahead.   
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4. Pieces in the Policy Puzzle 
The Terms of Reference for this report mentioned three ‘choices’ 
for the Government, namely: 
•	 Turning	land	into	capital	and	people	into	labour
•	 Eradicating	upland	rice	cultivation
•	 Promoting	 large-scale	 agribusiness	 at	 the	 expense	 of	
small-scale commercial production
These are not choices made by a single entity, nor have they been 
made in a common manner according to linear process. They 
represent the outcome of complex interactions among many 
groups of people over a long period of time. Nevertheless, these 
choices all point in the same direction. 
 
 4.1 Turning Land into Capital
Foreign investment in agricultural land started in the early 1990s 
but did not become a significant feature of the Lao economy 
until the following decade. Although this investment is broadly 
in line with the renovation process launched in 1986, it is hard 
to point to a specific law or decree that is responsible for the 
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boom in land concessions.  Like many other policies in Laos, the 
practice of ‘turning land into capital’ appears to have started as 
a localised experiment that was subsequently adopted as a 
national strategy. The first significant land concession was 
granted in 1990 to a Thai company, Asia Tech, for a eucalyptus 
plantation of 16,000 ha on the Bolavens Plateau. The Asia Tech 
experiment was a failure, and the company withdrew from Laos 
during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. However, a precedent 
had been established and once the crisis was over, other 
companies came looking for land. By 2003, the Government was 
approving more than 100 projects per year and it has never looked 
back. 
Granting of land concessions began in 1990 but the 
process was interrupted by the 1997-98 Asian financial 
crisis. Foreign investors looking for land came back 
after the crisis, and by 2003 the Government was 
approving more than 100 projects per year.
It may be more accurate to say the Government has almost 
never looked back. In May 2007, following reports of encroachment 
on protected areas by investors, the Prime Minister called for an 
indefinite moratorium on land concessions. Officials at all levels 
of government ignored the call, and the Prime Minister was 
replaced before the end of his expected term in office. 
 4.2 Eradicating Shifting Cultivation
The policy of eradicating shifting cultivation has a longer history 
than the policy of turning land into capital and has been 
supported in various ways by some donor agencies. For many years 
there has been an organisational unit within the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry tasked with achieving this policy (most 
recently a division within the National Agriculture and Forestry 
Extension Service), and field staff have been provided with detailed 
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guidelines (e.g. MAF Instruction 22 ‘to prepare for complete 
stopping of slash and burn and shifting cultivation’, February 2010).
MAF is not officially trying to eradicate upland rice 
production: rather the aim is to transform shifting 
production to a sedentary system. However, at district 
level the policy is to eradicate swidden and replace it 
with maize or rubber, while the media continues to 
demonize “slash-and-burn”.
Despite the institutionalisation of this policy, there are serious 
ambiguities and contradictions associated with its implementation. 
Officially, it is not the goal of the MAF to eradicate upland rice 
production: rather the aim is to bring about a transition from a 
shifting to a sedentary system of production. Furthermore, some 
agriculture officials at national level make a distinction between 
pioneering and rotational forms of shifting cultivation, and assert 
that only the former needs to be eradicated. These distinctions 
are rarely made at district level, where the eradication policy is 
used as a justification for converting rice swidden into maize fields 
or rubber plantations. Any nuances are lost in the media, where 
“slash-and-burn” continues to be demonised as a backward and 
destructive practice. 
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 4.3 Promotion of Large-Scale Agribusiness
The promotion of large-scale agribusiness at the expense of 
small-scale production is not reflected in government policy 
documents. On the contrary, MAF strategies published in 1999 
and 2010 emphasise the importance of small-scale farming. The 
latest strategy does make passing mention of “mega-projects”, 
but the overwhelming impression given by these documents is 
that the Ministry wishes to support pro-poor and green value 
chains, with smallholders as the key actors. A different impression 
is gained from reading the Vientiane Times, in which the 
approval of large-scale projects is reported every week. Perhaps 
the most egregious case involves the Vietnamese company HAGL, 
which – according to Kenney-Lazar – is bringing about 
“dispossession, semi-proletarianization, and enclosure” on a 
massive scale.
While in theory MAF strategies emphasise the           
importance of small-scale farming, the de facto pol-
icy seen in the field shows a clear disconnect.
How can the clear disconnect between the policy de jure and the de 
facto policy seen in the field be explained? The cynical view is that 
the MAF strategy was written by foreigner advisers for a foreign 
audience as part of the ‘aid game’. A more generous explanation is 
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that MAF is home to a group of enlightened and progressive officials 
who are fighting a losing battle with other ministries (most notably 
Planning and Investment, Industry and Commerce, and Natural 
Resources and the Environment), and who have very little control 
over the activities of field staff. In support of the latter explanation, 
a recent article in the Vientiane Times (18 January 2012), reported 
how Deputy Prime Minister Somsavat Lengsavad had advised the 
Ministry to ‘improve its contribution to the country’s growth’. The 
Vientiane Times frequently reports on the Deputy Prime Minister 
presiding over signing ceremonies for big contracts, which leaves 
little doubt that he would like to see MAF involved in more 
mega-projects, regardless of the strategy they have crafted. 
 4.4 Three Pieces, One Picture 
Despite the differences in the way these policies have emerged, they 
form an intelligible strategy of socio-economic restructuring that is 
largely explained by the perspectives outlined above. These ‘choices’ 
are a central part of the ongoing revolution taking place in a 
periphery country under the management of a paternalistic regime. 
Statements made by government officials provide a number of 
reasons why these choices are necessary. These include: 
•	 The	security	of	the	country	requires	the	reorganisation	of	
the rural population so that they can be more easily 
protected and guided; 
•	 Land	is	currently	unproductive,	methods	are	inefficient,	and	
both need to be changed;
•	 Industrialisation	requires	both	 labour	and	raw	materials,	
which need to come from rural areas; 
•	 Farmers	are	uneducated	and	 therefore	need	 to	be	 told	
what to do; 
•	 It	is	impossible	to	collect	revenue	from	thousands	of	small	
farmers, but much easier to tax a handful of companies.
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If we take these reasons at face value, they appear to be 
symptomatic of a technocratic regime of the type described by Scott 
in Thinking like a State (1998).  
“The unspoken logic behind most of the state projects for 
agricultural modernization was one of consolidating the power of 
central institutions and diminishing the autonomy of  cultivators 
and their communities”.
Modernisation has always been a central goal of the LPRP, and the 
reasons listed above are typical of the thinking in a bureaucratic 
communist regime. As Baird (2011) has recently explained, land 
concessions fit well with the Marxist theory of ‘primitive 
accumulation’: 
“… one of the main motivations of the government of Laos in 
granting large-scale land concessions is to remove peasants, and 
particularly indigenous peoples, from their conditions of production 
because they are seen as making unproductive use of resources 
and as being resistant to fully integrating into the market economy”.
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From a Marxist point of view, primitive accumulation is an 
essential step in the historical process that will lead – via the 
inherent contradictions in the capitalist mode of production - to 
socialism. That process appears to be happening at breakneck 
speed in Laos, bringing together the interests of communists, 
capitalists and – as pointed  out by Cornford (2006) – international 
development banks.
“IFIs such as the World Bank and ADB have a clear agenda to 
build a particular sort of global economic order…  
Technocratic decisions about transforming a rural labour force 
into an urban labour force are made without any consideration 
of the enormous implications that this has for people’s lives. 
Although the mechanism [of globalization] is different, this 
equates to social engineering on a scale similar to that 
attempted by the Communists”.
Although this technocratic logic may appeal to Marxist leaders 
and ADB economists alike, it is not a completely convincing 
rationale or explanation for the ongoing transformation of the 
rural economy in Laos.  
Proletarianization is undoubtedly taking place, but it 
is unlikely this is being engineered as part of a grand 
plan.
The term ‘engineering’ implies a strong element of design, yet 
the Government of Laos is not known for planning in a system-
atic, consistent or coherent way. While many policies emerge 
from local experimentation, the lack of accurate data and scien-
tific analysis puts decisions in the category of ‘opinion-based’ 
rather than ‘evidence-based’. Where analyses have been carried 
out, often with the support of donor partners, the evidence may 
point in a different direction to that being taken by the Govern-
ment. Ambitious targets are designed to ‘motivate’ rather than 
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act as a serious guide for action, and many officials are unable to 
provide a sound explanation for what they are doing. The vacuous 
claim that a project will ‘help eliminate poverty’ is almost syn-
onymous with ‘don’t ask questions, just get on with it’. 
Another reason for doubting that the Government is deliberately 
dispossessing peasants in order to create an industrial working 
class, whether as part of an unfinished Marxist revolution or as 
part of a neoliberal conspiracy led by the World Bank, is the 
simple fact that it is not working. A lot of foreign investment is 
stifling the development of local industry, and many of the farmers 
who lost their livelihoods have become migrant workers in Thailand. 
While proletarianization is undoubtedly taking place in Laos, it 
does not appear to be part of a grand plan. 
 4.5  The Name of the Beast
What economic or political mechanism is hiding behind the 
technocratic veneer? 
Andreisse (2011) suggests that the answer is a variety of capitalism 
he calls “State Coordinated Frontier Economy” 
“…in which elites and foreign investors accumulate wealth at 
the expense of small firms, villagers and the natural environment. 
The government is particularly present in the spheres of finance 
and inter-company relations. A continuation of this variety of 
capitalism is likely to result in excessive inequality and severe 
environmental degradation”.
The concept of a “frontier economy” is consistent with the 
perspective of Laos as a periphery country suffering from the 
resource curse. Andriesse convincingly argues that this economy 
is not “unregulated”, as claimed by Cohen (2009). On the 
contrary, “the Lao government has enabled frontier capitalism 
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through deliberate facilitation and intervention in markets”. 
Andreisse also notes that there are “historically informed 
cultural institutions” that are preventing “ameliorative policy 
initiatives”, but what is he talking about?  What are the cultural 
institutions that sustain this variety of capitalism? 
As a periphery country suffering from the resource 
curse, Laos presents a “frontier economy”. This frontier 
capitalism has been deliberately facilitated through 
neopatrimonialism - the use of state authority to 
sustain a system of patronage. 
The best available term may be ‘neopatrimonialism’. A recent 
paper by von Soest (2010) provides a good introduction to this 
concept:
 “…neopatrimonialism denotes the simultaneous operation of 
patrimonialism and legal-rational domination. Specifically, the 
ideal type of patrimonialism connotes that a patron in a certain 
social and political order bestows gifts from private resources 
on followers to obtain and strengthen their loyalty …
The “neo” in neopatrimonialism stands for the formal institutions 
and rational-legal rule of the state, which coexist along with 
patrimonial relations. Patrons typically are office-holders who 
use public funds or the power of being in office to build a 
personal following allowing them to stay in power.”
In short, neopatrimonialism involves the use of state authority 
and apparatus to sustain a system of patronage. In the Lao system, 
many of the ‘gifts’ bestowed by party leaders take the form of 
trading concessions (i.e. monopsonies), approval for lucrative 
deals with foreign investors, and official positions that bring 
rent-seeking opportunities. We could add the management of 
development projects to this list of patrimony, although this gift 
is probably less attractive than being the local partner for a 
Special Economic Zone. 
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If there is a flaw with the neopatrimonial tag, it is perhaps that 
this is a generalisation with negative connotations. Undoubtedly 
the Lao system includes benevolent patrons as well as reluctant 
clients, plus many officials who are trying to get on with a job for 
its own sake rather than as a means for ingratiating themselves 
with their benefactors. Nevertheless, patrimonialism is widespread 
in the Lao government system. It helps to explain why 
organisational structures and strategies tend to change with 
senior appointments. It also explains why junior staff often have 
no formal job description or, if they do, it can be disregarded by 
their bosses.  
Above all else, neopatrimonialism helps to explain why so many 
development projects appear to be designed to benefit 
government officials as much as they benefit ordinary people. 
Whether we see this system as a continuation of pre-colonial 
feudalism, or a more recent outcome of revolutionary elitism, it 
does not place any importance on smallholders. The appointment 
of Village Heads represents the furthest reach of the patronage 
system, beyond which there is nothing to be gained from farmers 
who want to manage their land in a self-sufficient manner.  
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5. Megatrends
The above analysis helps to explain why many development 
projects do not have the impacts desired by the donors. 
However, additional perspectives are needed to identify how a 
bilateral donor like SDC can optimise its support to the sector.  
 5.1 Looking Beyond Specifics
It may be useful to move the level of analysis upward, beyond a 
concern for rubber plantations and the Xayabury dam, to look at 
the megatrends taking place in Laos. 
Megatrends are large-scale changes in circumstances. They are 
broader than changes in the area or yield of specific crops, and 
they encompass multiple behaviours and diverse impacts. 
Megatrends are changes of profound and lasting significance. 
They are part of the history of the country, not a statistical blip. 
Donor agencies have moved from trying to make 
development happen under difficult circumstances  to 
needing to help protect the vulnerable. Poverty 
alleviation is no longer a general challenge, but 
increasingly one that affects pockets of society. Lao 
society is becoming more complex as isolation 
disappears. Increasing connectedness, climate change 
and the world economic crisis are making it difficult 
to plan ahead.
Here are some of the broad trends taking place in Laos, which 
cut across society as a whole, with consequences for development 
programmes in all sectors. 
Increasing dynamism: Laos is no longer ‘left out’ or ‘left behind’ 
from regional and global developments, but racing along while 
the donor partners struggle to figure out how to respond. Donor 
agencies have moved from a time when they were trying to make 
development happen under difficult circumstances (e.g. by 
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encouraging investment, introducing new technology, linking 
farmers to market) to a time when they need to help protect the 
vulnerable from the negative impacts of development (e.g. by 
addressing problems of landlessness, occupational health 
problems etc). Further ideas about mitigation are given in section 
6 below. 
Increasing inequality: If the key goal of the government and 
the donors is poverty alleviation, then this is no longer a general 
challenge for Laos, but increasingly one that affects pockets of 
society. Many people are benefiting from the rapid growth of the 
economy, and many problems are now being addressed by investment 
and services provided by both the public and private sectors. Some 
groups, however, are being left out and left behind, suggesting 
that programmes and projects should have a more specific focus. 
Increasing complexity: Lao society has never been homogenous, 
but circumstances have become even more diverse as change 
affects different people in different ways.  This complexity has a 
fractal nature, with variation in conditions and behaviours occurring 
at the provincial, district, village and household levels. Generalisations 
and averages are becoming meaningless. 
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Increasing connectedness: This has been already been touched 
upon. The connections that hold society together, and which 
determine how people interact are changing in a profound 
manner. The isolation and remoteness of the past is rapidly 
disappearing, and national borders are declining in significance 
as a boundary for social and economic behaviour. 
Increasing uncertainty: As dynamism and complexity increase, 
there is an inevitable decline in our ability to predict what might 
happen in the future. Increasing connectedness also means that 
the behaviour of ‘beneficiary’ groups is less dependent on the 
interventions of any particular development patron. Meanwhile, 
climate change and the crisis in the world economy are making 
it difficult for everybody to plan ahead. 
 
 5.2  Broad Responses
How might a development agency like SDC adapt its strategy and 
portfolio in light of these megatrends? Here are some broad 
ideas for consideration:
Intelligence: An organisation like SDC cannot make appropriate 
decisions unless it knows what is happening. The dynamic and 
complex situation in Laos, combined with the dearth of accurate 
statistics, makes it necessary to invest in information gathering 
and research within the agency. The challenge is not only to 
collect and store data, but to carry out analysis, develop scenarios 
and make projections. Clearly the agency needs an efficient 
knowledge management system, needs to commission studies, 
and needs to liaise with organisations with recognised expertise 
in Southeast Asian affairs. 
Goal-setting: Some of the goals of the past are no longer relevant. 
Adoption of new technologies, increases in yields, market engagement 
and economic growth are going to take place with or without 
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help from SDC. Other goals such as resilience and equity are 
becoming more important in view of ongoing trends and the 
challenges ahead. 
Targeting: Assuming that poverty eradication remains a goal, 
there may need to be a greater specificity with regard to location 
and clients. The idea of working with farmers in general no 
longer makes sense, and the characterisation of the uplands as 
“poor and remote” is rapidly becoming redundant. The process 
of establishing targets could involve some form of ‘triage’: not 
only would the process recognise that some locations/groups no 
longer need support, but it would also recognise that effective 
support for some other groups/locations is not possible due to 
institutional constraints. 
Donors need to gather and analyse data to develop 
scenarios and make projections. As the characterisation 
of the uplands as “poor and remote” rapidly becomes 
redundant, goals need to be reset. Agencies may need 
to be more flexible, with greater focus on             
emergency response and contingencies, and making 
use of diverse approaches and cross-border networks 
to support multiple groups.
Responsiveness: Given the uncertainty that exists about the future 
situation in Laos, SDC may need to devote a greater portion of 
resources to emergency response and contingencies. Experience of 
recent years suggests that floods, epidemics, and food shortages will 
be continue to be a threat, but many other threats and opportunities 
are likely to emerge at short notice. 
Flexibility:  Not only does the country programme need to be responsive, 
so do individual projects. Implementation needs to be managed in an 
organic rather than mechanical manner. Monitoring should look at 
context and impacts, not just activities and outputs, and logframes 
may need to be revised during the course of implementation. 
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Pluralism: In view of the context and trends that have been 
described above, a pluralistic approach that would spread risk 
and promote innovation is desirable. The programme and 
individual projects should provide support to multiple groups and 
associations, making use of diverse channels and approaches, 
while accepting that some interventions will succeed and others 
may fail.
Networks:  Poverty and vulnerability is usually correlated with 
position in the social network. As Laos citizens become more 
connected, some are consolidating their wealth and power while 
others continue to be excluded. Opportunities for helping 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups to make connections and 
build alliances that enable them solve their own problems should 
be considered as an alternative to patronage. Agencies like SDC 
could play a particularly important role in supporting cross-border 
networking; consequently, better analysis of what is happening 
across the region should be part of the agency’s intelligence. 
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6. A Mitigation Strategy: 10 Issues to be Addressed
In response to the trends outlined above, donors may want to 
shift emphasis from a proactive to a reactive development 
strategy in Laos. Although aid projects are no longer a primary 
instigator of change in the agriculture sector, the donor partners 
can play an important role in helping rural people cope with the 
changes that are taking place. 
A number of current projects are promoting ‘green’ farming 
systems. These involve groups of small farmers who are producing 
food – primarily for local consumption - using techniques that 
require few external inputs. Meanwhile, the private sector is 
promoting ‘brown’ farming systems, involving the large-scale use 
of agro-chemicals to produce commodities for export.
The global food industry depends on brown farming systems, and 
this industry provides employment and income for a large number 
of people. Nevertheless, the transition from green/subsistence 
farming to brown/commercial agriculture has a number of 
negative impacts, especially in a country where governance is 
weak. 
Improvements in rural livelihoods in Laos can no longer be achieved 
solely through projects of the kind that have been funded in the 
past. Improvements in smallholder productivity and the creation of 
organic/fair trade value chains are undoubtedly useful, but the 
number of farmers who can benefit from these interventions is 
shrinking. Donor support is also required to mitigate the negative 
impacts of industrial agriculture on a growing number of households. 
Here are ten issues that need to be addressed:
1. Occupational health. The use of pesticides is on the increase in 
Laos and there is a particular danger to plantation workers, who are 
expected to use large quantities every day. Chemicals classified by the 
42
World Health Organisation as ‘extremely hazardous’ or ‘highly 
hazardous’ (toxicity class 1a and 1b) are widely available despite being 
officially banned. Enforcement of regulations, farmer awareness of 
the dangers, and the use of protective measure are almost non-existent. 
Experience in neighbouring countries suggests that there will be 
significant levels of chronic illness and fatality as a consequence of this 
situation. 
2. Environmental pollution. Pesticides are not the only input that is 
on the increase. Plastic film is also being used on a large scale under 
contract farming in the north of the country. This will inevitably lead 
to ‘white pollution’ of the kind experienced in China. Intensification 
of livestock production is also creating a problem of waste disposal. 
Animal slurry can be used as fertilizer, but is often left to contaminate 
the local environment.
3. Epidemic diseases. Intensive livestock production also increases 
the risk of epidemic diseases. Laos has a poor reputation for animal 
health, with repeated outbreaks of swine fever, foot and mouth and 
hemorrhagic septicaemia. Anthrax was reported as recently at 2008. 
The proximity to Southern China, where new diseases such as SARS 
have emerged in recent years, makes the weak capacity in Laos 
particularly worrying. 
43
4. Soil erosion. Severe erosion has already been documented as 
a consequence of the ‘maize boom’ in provinces such as Xayabury. 
Agence Française de Développement has invested heavily in 
efforts to promote soil conservation, but with limited impact 
outside the project area. The Government recognises that 
watershed management is needed to maximise returns from 
hydropower, but secondary forest continues to give way to 
plantations that are prone to run-off.  
5. Food security and nutrition. Laos already has unacceptable 
levels of malnutrition; will commercial agriculture make the 
situation better or worse? Reports published by the World Food 
Programme and SDC suggest there are strong reasons for concern. 
While some officials posit that producers of non-food 
commodities such as rubber will be able to buy sufficient rice, 
communities such as those studied by TERRA in Bachieng show 
a decline in food security following the establishment of 
plantation crops. 
6. Indebtedness. The report on ‘Farmers Voices’ suggests that 
indebtedness is a widespread consequence of commercialisation. 
This issue will soon be the subject of a follow-up study organised 
by the Lao Extension Agriculture Project for the Sub-Working 
Group on Agribusiness. The need for a reliable system of rural 
credit has long been recognised in Laos, but projects that provide 
financial grants and free inputs have not always helped create 
the foundation for such a system. 
7. Rural unemployment. Farm labour requirements have always 
been seasonal, and for many years people have migrated from 
rural areas of Laos to seek work in Thailand. It is difficult to get 
an accurate picture of how this situation is changing, but it seems 
that the number of Lao labourers working in Thailand is rising. 
Remittances are precarious given that many – if not most – of the 
Lao migrants are working without legal protection. While brown 
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agriculture provides some opportunities for semi-skilled labour in 
Laos, many of these new jobs are going to workers from China 
and Vietnam. 
8. Land conflicts. In recent years, all of the countries surrounding 
Laos have witnessed protests, violent clashes and arrests involving 
farmers who are losing their land.  Some of these land grabs are 
associated with plantation agriculture, while others relate to dams, 
mines, golf courses and housing. It seems unlikely that Laos will 
be immune from such conflicts. Improvements in education and 
communication and a greater awareness of rights may mean that 
rural people are less willing to tolerate the type of resettlement 
that has been so common in the past.
9. Loss of biodiversity. Laos is a biodiversity hotspot, with new 
species being discovered every year. Not only does this diversity 
include weird insects and bizarre amphibians, it also includes a 
globally important collection of crop varieties. Second only to 
India in terms of the number of rice strains, the country also has 
hundreds of types of vegetable. Much of this diversity has evolved 
and been sustained as part of swidden agriculture that is now 
being eradicated to make way for cash crops such as rubber, 
sugar, cassava, and maize.
10. The carbon footprint. Climate change is not a problem that 
can be solved by any one country. It requires the collective efforts of 
all governments, all donor organisations, and – ultimately – all 
producers and consumers. Industrial agriculture is a major contributor 
of greenhouse gasses. Production of nitrogen fertilizers and plastic 
film, intensification of livestock production, mechanisation and 
transportation all add to the carbon footprint of agriculture. The 
consequences of this are already being felt by farmers in the uplands 
of Laos.  
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